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ARTICLE 
Silent Partners: Private Forces, Mercenaries, and International 
Humanitarian Law in the 21st Century 
Steven R. Kochheiser  
ABSTRACT 
In response to gritty accounts of firefights involving private forces like Blackwater in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, many legal scholars have addressed the rising use of private forces—or mercenaries—in the 
21st century under international law. Remarkably, only a few have attempted to understand why these forces 
are so objectionable. This is not a new problem. Historically, attempts to control private forces by bringing 
them under international law have been utterly ineffective, such as Article 47 of Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions. In Silent Partners, I propose utilizing the norm against mercenary use as a theoretical 
framework to understand at what point private forces become objectionable and then draft a provision of 
international humanitarian law to effectively control their use. Such a provision will encourage greater 
compliance with international law by these forces and reduce their negative externalities by ensuring 
legitimate control and attachment to a legitimate cause. 
                                                 
 J.D. with High Distinction, Ohio Northern University, May 2011. Currently an Assistant Attorney General in the Ohio 
Attorney General's Office as well as a Technical Sergeant in the Ohio Air National Guard. I would like to thank Professor 
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I. PRIVATE FORCES 
Considered a “silent partner” by Congressional leaders, private contractors became more visible in 
2004 when combating a fledgling insurgency by “racing around Iraq in armored cars” and even forming 
diplomatic alliances with local clans.1 The extensive role of private force in the reconstruction of Iraq was 
graphically brought to the attention of the public and policymakers after four Blackwater employees were 
killed and their bodies mutilated by an angry crowd in Fallujah.2 As these silent partners started to directly 
engage in intense firefights with insurgents, legal scholars began debating the status of these private forces 
under international law.3 
By 2007, there were nearly 180,000 private contractors in Iraq, approximately 20-30,000 of which 
were armed, supporting 165,000 U.S. soldiers.4 In September of that year, the controversy regarding the use 
of private contractors reached its pinnacle after Blackwater forces guarding a State Department convoy 
opened fire in Nisour Square in Baghdad and, according to an FBI investigation, killed fourteen civilians 
without cause. 5 As U.S. forces gradually withdraw from Iraq, an important legacy of this conflict and the 
broader War on Terror will undoubtedly be the controversial presence of private force on the battlefield. 
A critical component of this legacy is understanding the challenges faced when attempting to construe 
international humanitarian law (IHL) to deal with the growing role of private forces in international armed 
conflicts. 
It is important to note at the outset that some disagreement exists regarding whether the current armed 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are of an international character. If a conflict is not of an international 
character, then only the minimum provisions of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 apply.6 While 
the Department of Defense considers the Geneva Conventions to apply in their entirety to the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan as international armed conflicts pursuant to the Common Article 2, some scholars 
disagree with this view.7 These scholars argue that after sovereignty was turned over to the governments of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the occupations officially ended and the conflicts were no longer of an international 
character between two parties to the Geneva Conventions.8 Rather, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan now 
involve the United States aiding sovereign governments to fight a domestic insurgency, not another nation. 
Therefore, only the minimum provisions of Common Article 3 apply and possibly Additional Protocol II.9 
                                                 
1 David Barstow, Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/19/world/security-companies-shadow-soldiers-in-iraq.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
(quoting former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jeff Warner as describing private security contracts as “silent 
partners in this struggle.”). 
2 Peter Singer, Warriors for Hire in Iraq, SALON.COM (Apr. 15, 2004), http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/04/15/warriors/print.html 
(describing the general lack of awareness by the policymakers and even senior Pentagon officials of the growing role of private force in 
Iraq). 
3 Oliver R. Jones, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions of Private Military Firms, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
239, 241–42 (2009) (discussing the struggle by academics to deal with rising use of private forces in spite of a “vacuum of law 
that only serves to confirm accusations that international law is too weak to deal with the problem.”). 
4 Michael Hurst, After Blackwater: A Mission-Focused Jurisdictional Regime for Private Military Contractors During 
Contingency Operations, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1308, 1310 (2008). 
5 Id. at 1308–09; David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html?pagewanted=all. 
6 Ellen L. Frye, Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining “Mercenary” Can Tame the “Dogs of War,” 
73 Fordham L. Rev. 2607, 2625 (2005). 
7 See Captain Daniel P. Ridlon, Contractors or Illegal Combatants? The Status of Armed Contractors in Iraq, 62 A.F. L. REV. 
199, 205 n.30 (2008) (discussing a Department of Defense General Counsel memorandum that concluded that the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan continued to remain international armed conflicts as ongoing hostilities are in the “transition, or stability 
operations” phase). 
8 Id., at 204–07. 
9 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (Additional Protocol II supplements the 
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One could certainly argue, however, that these conflicts retain their international character as the de facto 
occupations that followed the initial invasions and continue to persist uninterrupted with tens of thousands of 
foreign soldiers occupying both nations.10 Still, scholars do not question the importance of considering the 
status of the private forces in Iraq and Afghanistan under the Geneva Conventions and IHL, as these forces 
are part of a “trend toward increasing privatization” that will undoubtedly be present in future international 
armed conflicts.11 Thus, while the status of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan under the Geneva 
Conventions is debatable, analyzing the use of private force in these conflicts is relevant when applying the 
theoretical framework of the norm against mercenarism to current IHL provisions as well as proposals that 
seek to ban or regulate the use of private force.12 
The term “private force” encompasses what might traditionally be thought of as “mercenaries.”13 
The use of the term mercenary is problematic when used to describe modern private military and 
security firms due in part to its negative connotation, but more importantly because it is a legal term of 
art describing a group that may be subject to criminal sanctions.14 Because this article will focus on 
these firms, the term “private force,” as described in Section II, will be used throughout. The term 
“mercenary” will only appear when used in a historical sense, predating its use as a legal term of art, 
and when used in IHL provisions or academic theories that provide a specific definition for the term. 
II. BENDING THE SPEAR: EMERGENCE OF THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY 
AND THE NORM AGAINST MERCENARY USE TO DEFINE “MERCENARY” 
Private force has maintained a controversial presence on the battlefield for millennia. Biblical 
references from the sixth century BC by Jeremiah described mercenaries in Egypt as “fattened calves” that 
“will turn and flee together, they will not stand their ground, for the day of disaster is coming upon them, the 
time for them to be punished.”15 Over time, a norm against the use of private force evolved and it is said that 
“[f]or as long as there have been mercenaries, there has been a norm against mercenary use.”16 Despite this 
norm against mercenarism, IHL has been ineffective in proscribing the use of these controversial forces. 
Definitions of mercenary conduct in IHL are inflexible and focus on the nationality and motivation of 
fighters as the two primary components.17 
The modern private force industry emerged in the early 1990s after the downsizing of post-Cold 
War militaries created an increased supply of former soldiers and “disengagement from select zones of 
influence (particularly Africa)” increased the demand for private forces.18 The use of private force 
                                                                                                                                                                         
protections provided by Common Article 3 in non-international armed conflicts. However, the application of Protocol II is 
restricted to armed conflicts between a contracting party’s armed forces and insurgent groups that are “under responsible 
command” and exercise control over part of the party’s territory from which it is able to launch military operations. While 
certain periods during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan might satisfy this definition, neither the United States nor Iraq are 
parties to Protocol II and Afghanistan only recently acceded to Protocol II in 2009.) [hereinafter Protocol II]; Ridlon, supra 
note 7, at 206–07. 
10 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Geneva III] (stating that “The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”). 
11 Ridlon, supra note 7, at 207. 
12 See E.L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and Its Implications for International 
Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 221–22 (2008) (using the term “mercenarism” to generally describe 
the use of mercenaries). 
13 Ridlon, supra note 7, at 208–09. 
14 Id. 
15 Jeremiah 46:21 (New International Version). 
16 SARAH PERCY, MERCENARIES: THE HISTORY OF A NORM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1 (2007). 
17 Id. at 52. 
18 Gaston, supra note 12, at 224 (stating that “[g]lobalization expanded opportunities for the growth of transnational business 
sectors like the private security industry, while neo-liberal trends toward outsourcing government functions to the private 
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allowed policymakers to avoid politically unpopular decisions, like instituting a draft, and to distance 
themselves from any mistakes made during a conflict.19 The private force industry “seems to have 
largely succeeded in portraying itself as a new phenomenon to which the old rules regarding 
mercenaries do not apply.”20 Thus, using the theoretical framework of the norm against mercenary use 
to analyze the modern emergence of private force is an important initial step before evaluating IHL 
provisions and proposals purporting to ban or regulate its use. 
A. THE NORM AGAINST MERCENARISM 
Norms in international law result from a sense of constrained behavior or legal obligation that “is usually 
regarded as reaching the status of customary international law only when it is reflected by state practice and 
opinio juris, or the belief that a norm is accepted as law.”21 The norm against mercenarism historically 
comprises two elements: concerns regarding legitimate control and the notion of martial honor connected to 
serving a cause.22 Mercenaries are widely regarded as morally problematic because they operate outside the 
“legitimate, authoritative control” of a sovereign and because they are motivated by “selfish, financial reasons 
as opposed to ... some kind of larger conception of common good” or “cause.”23 The two elements that 
comprise the norm against mercenarism are legitimate control and degree of attachment to a cause. These 
elements are the product of two gradual shifts away from the use of mercenaries.24 
From the twelfth to seventeenth centuries, mercenaries were brought under “legitimate control” of 
sovereigns and thereby became less objectionable.25 However, late in this same period and continuing into 
the nineteenth century, the rise of the nation-state cast mercenaries in an increasingly negative light. Many 
considered them to be immoral because they were not fighting for an “appropriate cause.”26 It was 
generally believed that only citizens under control of and fighting for the state had the proper motivation 
to wage war.27 Writing in the sixteenth century, Machiavelli described this attitudinal shift when he 
provided a normative analysis of mercenary use that illustrated both the legitimate control and appropriate 
cause elements. Machiavelli described the sovereign as fulfilling his duty to defend the state by using his 
own subjects in defense of the state as they are best motivated to fight for the common cause of the state.28 
He stated that “when arms have to be resorted to . . . then the prince ought to go in person and perform the 
duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens . . . [a]nd experience has shown princes and 
republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage . . . 
.”29 This view is indicative of the shift of both elements of the norm against mercenary use during the rise 
of the nation-state. 
Despite the rise of nation-states and citizen armies, mercenaries continued to supplement militaries.30 
In the nineteenth century, however, the use of mercenaries suddenly went “out of style.”31 Scholars struggle 
                                                                                                                                                                         
sector rationalized the outsourcing of military and security functions that previously had been guarded as the exclusive 
province of the state.”). 
19 Zoe Salzman, Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputation, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 853, 869 
(2008). 
20 Id. at 856. 
21 PERCY, supra note 16, at 18–19. 
22 Id. at 1. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 59, 65–66. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 66; see also Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 
CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 1, 6 (1999) (discussing the ideology of the use of military force as the “preeminent cultural construction of 
‘appropriate’ violence”). 
28 NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, Chapter XII, available at: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/machiavelli-prince.html. 
29 Id. 
30 Michael Scheimer, Separating Private Military Companies from Illegal Mercenaries in International Law, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 609, 615 (2009). 
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with this phenomenon as up until that time “states had successfully controlled the mercenary problem.”32 
Greater control over mercenaries seemed to at least partially satisfy the legal obligation underlying the norm 
against mercenarism for legitimate control over force. Yet in spite of this control, a norm against 
mercenarism emerged.33 During the period from the Crimean War to the 1960s, the norm against 
mercenarism was so absolute that the reemergence of mercenaries in multiple African civil wars following 
decolonization was extremely controversial and unsettling.34 In response, numerous attempts were made 
under international law to limit or prohibit their use.35 The absence of mercenaries during this period and the 
negative response to their return serves as evidence of the commonly shared sense that a legal obligation 
against mercenarism underlies this norm. To better understand how the norm against mercenarism might 
influence the application of IHL to private forces, one must first analyze the range of services and types of 
firms that have recently emerged. 
B. PETER SINGER’S “TIP OF THE SPEAR TYPOLOGY” 
 
Many scholars rely on Peter Singer’s “tip of the spear typology” which provides a linear 
classification of firms in the private force industry according to their services.36 This typology is helpful 
in understanding the broad range of services provided by modern private forces that range from frontline 
combat to rear echelon support and the variety of tasks in between. Singer divides all private force into 
the three broad sectors of military provider firms – more commonly referred to as private military firms 
(PMFs)37 – military consulting firms, and military support firms.38 PMFs generally have a “focus on the 
tactical environment” providing actual combat as well as direct command and control.39 Executive 
Outcomes is an example of a PMF. It operated in Sierra Leone at the request of the government in 1995, 
providing a battalion of ground troops supported by artillery and air units that successfully 
outmaneuvered and defeated a rebel army invasion.40 Military consulting firms, like MPRI, “provide 
advisory and training services” frequently employing a staff of former military officers.41 MPRI (a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of L-3 Communications) operates many U.S. military officer training 
programs including the ROTC courses at hundreds of college campuses as well as training foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                         
31 Deborah Avant, Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 
Winter 2000 at 41. 
32 PERCY, supra note 16, at 94–95. 
33 See id. (arguing that “The long history of moral dislike of mercenaries, and attempts to control them, makes the nineteenth 
century shift away from mercenary armies even more puzzling”). 
34 Id. at 167. 
35 Id. 
36 PETER SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 90–98 (2008); see Jones, supra 
note 3, at 245 (describing Singer’s typology as “widely used and supported in existing literage as a method of dividing firms 
by the function they perform.”); Salzman, supra note 19, at 857 (discussing Singer’s breakdown of the types of firms of the 
private military industry); Richard Morgan, Professional Military Firms Under International Law, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 217 
(2008) (advocating relying on the more relevant distinction regarding whether a private firm has the “capability to engage in 
hostilities, either offensively or defensively). 
37 Gaston, supra note 12, at 224–25 (referring to military provider firms as private military firms). 
38 SINGER, supra note 36, at 90–98. 
39 Id. at 99–116. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 117–33. 
Military Provider 











militaries and security forces.42 Singer notes that the line can become “quite fuzzy” between advising 
and implementing, citing the consulting firm Vinnell fighting alongside Saudi National Guard troops in 
combat during the first Gulf War.43 Military support firms, like KBR (formerly a subsidiary of 
Halliburton), provide “non-lethal aid and assistance” such as logistical support, intelligence, and 
transportation.44 KBR has been involved in a broad range of activities from building facilities for War 
on Terror detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to assisting in the dismantling of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) in Russia.45 
The “single unifying factor for the privatized military industry” in Singer’s analysis is that all 
firms at least provide “services that fall within the military domain.”46 Singer admits that these 
categories are a “conceptual framework” as some firms will fall within one category while others will 
span several but may still have internal divisions that fit more comfortably into one category.47 The 
visual aid of a spear is used to demonstrate the spectrum of private force from the “tip of the spear” 
front line forces to rear echelon support forces.48 According to the spear visual aid, firms characterized 
as PMFs that provide direct combat functions sit at the “tip of the spear,” firms providing logistical 
support are located toward the “base of the spear,” and firms providing consultant services fall 
somewhere in the middle.49 Private Security Companies (PSCs) are a notable addition to the spectrum, 
particularly following the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.50 PSCs seem to belong somewhere 
between PMFs and consulting firms as they provide services such as security protection, covert 
operations, and interrogation.51 PSCs fill this area of the spectrum as they may not “engage in direct 
combat” but perform duties such as guarding military bases, embassies, checkpoints, or convoys that 
are “likely to draw fire.”52 
While it is tempting to provide each new evolution of private force with a spot along the “tip of the 
spear” spectrum and draw a line where conduct is unacceptable as constituting mercenarism, this 
approach is insufficient. Such a distinction between types of private firms seems tenuous as even those 
providing traditionally rear echelon support sustained relatively high casualties in Iraq.53 The dynamic 
nature of asymmetric warfare demonstrated that private forces could suddenly become objectionable 
even when their position along the spear does not change. For example, the firm Blackwater performed 
largely the same role of providing security throughout its time in Iraq; however, its presence eventually 
became unacceptable over the course of the conflict. At no point did Blackwater’s role shift any closer 
to the tip of the spear. Thus, to explain why the presence of Blackwater became objectionable in Iraq, 
the tip of the spear typology must be considered in conjunction with the norm against mercenarism to 
understand at what point firms like Blackwater and their activities become unacceptable as 
mercenarism. 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 95. 
44 Id. at 134–45. 
45 Id. 
46 SINGER, supra note 36, at 88. 
47 Id. at 90–93; see also Gaston, supra note 12, at 225 n.11 (describing the lines in Singer’s typology as “blurred,” making 
classification of a firm into any single category based on services difficult). 
48 SINGER, supra note 36, at 90–93. 
49 Id.; see also Gaston, supra note 12, at 225 n.11 (citing Singer’s “tip-of-the-spear” typology). 
50 Gaston, supra note 12, at 226. 
51 See id. at 226–28 (discussing PSCs emerging as a result of increased demand for their services in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
addition to more traditional PSC services in the 1990s to organizations such as the UN and NATO by protecting refugees or 
border monitoring). 
52 Id. 
53 See David Ivanovich, Contract Deaths Up 17 Percent Across Iraq in 2007, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2008, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5528613.html (stating that ninety-seven KBR workers had died in Iraq by the end 
of 2007 and at least 1,123 contractors had died as well, according to Department of Labor statistics). 
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C. BENDING THE SPEAR: DEFINING MODERN PRIVATE FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NORM 
AGAINST MERCENARISM 
Some firms that provide “tip of the spear” services are acceptable when operating under legitimate 
control and serving a proper cause, but are objectionable when the control element shifts.54 Blackwater 
engaged in a particularly intense and highly controversial firefight with an Iraqi crowd in Najaf alongside 
Coalition forces to defend a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headquarters in April 2004.55 Yet, the 
firm continued to play an active role in Iraq until the Nisour Square incident in Baghdad in September 
2007.56 Its role then diminished following Iraqi demands that the firm leave and the State department refused 
to renew its contract.57 The norm against mercenarism would explain why Blackwater forces engaging in a 
firefight alongside Coalition forces to defend a Coalition installation was less objectionable than Blackwater 
forces engaging in a firefight alone to defend a Coalition convoy. While the firm was performing the same 
role as a PSC during both incidents, the apparent lack of legitimate control and accountability during the 
Nisour Square incident made Blackwater’s conduct objectionable as mercenarism. 
The shortfall of most IHL definitions of mercenarism is that they ignore “[t]he element of 
accountability [as] the tacit standard that underlies the international antipathy for mercenary activity and 
truly determines mercenary status.”58 While accountability is important, the norm also prohibits force not 
justified by attachment to a cause.59 Thus, a definition of mercenarism needs to encompass the legal 
obligation that private force must fall within a specific range on the spectrum of both legitimate control and 
attachment to a cause. 
Sarah Percy provides the “Spectrum of Private Violence” based on the norm against mercenarism with 
“Legitimate control” as the y-axis and “Degree of attachment to a cause” as the x-axis.60 This approach 
helps predict what private force might be proscribed pursuant to the norm against mercenarism rather than 
Singer’s linear classification based on the services that private forces provide. The norm-based spectrum 
evolves with time and prevents private firms from engineering their functions or even names to escape 
accountability as a private actor.
                                                 
54 See JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY 195 (2007) (describing 
the United States news headlines debating the use of private forces after Blackwater, private contractors, had a large 
involvement in Fallujah and Najaf). 
55 Id. at 186–96 (describing the firefight in detail, including Blackwater contractors directing Coalition forces as well as directly 
fighting insurgents). 
56 See Hurst, supra note 4, at 1308–09 (describing the Nisour Square incident). 
57 Id.; see Johnston & Broder, supra note 5, at A1 (addressing the investigation into Blackwater’s actions in Nisour Square); 
James Risen & Timothy Williams, U.S. Looks for Blackwater Replacement in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A8, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/middleeast/30blackwater.html (discussing Iraq’s refusal to grant 
Blackwater a license to operate within the country, forcing the State Department to seek a new security firm). 
58 Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and 
the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75, 122 (1998). 
59 Id. at 121–22. 
60 PERCY, supra note 16, at 59. 
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Degree of Attachment to a Cause
 
Modified version of Sarah Percy’s Spectrum of Private Violence.61 White-circle points and the “bent spear” were added by 
the author. Shaded-area, also added, signifies conduct generally considered mercenarism. 
Locating a firm and its activities on Percy’s norm-based spectrum first requires defining mercenaries in 
accordance with their motivation to fight for a cause, “encapsulat[ing] both the idea that mercenaries are 
external to a conflict and that they fight for financial gain, and furthermore recognizes that foreigners can 
fight without being considered mercenaries[.]”62 Whether motivated by religious, ideological, or ethnic 
causes, foreigners fighting for more than a financial gain receive some recognition of legitimacy under this 
definition.63 The second element of “legitimate control” then ensures fighters remain “under the control of 
the entity which is understood to have the legitimate right to wage war” resulting in sanctions for 
misbehavior and other aspects of control.64 Thus, entities exhibiting no legitimate control and only fighting 
for personal gain serve as the clearest example of mercenaries.65 
The tip of the spear typology is useful when applied to Percy’s spectrum as it aids in expanding the 
scope of modern private force analyzed in accordance with the norm against mercenarism. Percy’s analysis 
focuses on historic uses of private force from the Middle Ages to the present day, but tends to combine most 
forms of modern private force into the categories of PSCs and PMFs.66 This approach does not distinguish 
PSCs from more support oriented private supply firms or consulting firms.67 Such a distinction is important 
as PMFs have largely disappeared from the international stage while the market for PSCs is growing 
rapidly.68 Thus, a spear more fully populated with modern variations in private force provides for a more 
thorough analysis of when these become objectionable pursuant to the norm against mercenarism. 
Supply and consulting firms do not present the same control concerns as PSCs as they tend to be 
unarmed and their services are directed by a state party to the conflict. 69 Both sets of firms are still generally 
                                                 
61 PERCY, supra note 16, Figure 2.1. 
62 Id. at 54. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 57. 
65 See Id. at 59 (explaining through reference to the diagram that those who fight only for themselves are placed in the lowest 
corner of the diagram). 
66 See id. at 58–64 (Noting that Percy refers to PMFs as Private Military Companies or PMCs. Percy’s use of the term Private 
Military Company is essentially the same as Private Military Firm as defined above and will be used throughout for 
consistency.). 
67 See id. at 60–61, 225 (noting PSCs offer similar services as PMFs, or PMCs, such as military advice, training, and guarding 
facilities but differentiating PSCs from PMFs based on their unwillingness to engage in combat and higher degree of state 
control). 
68 See id. at 225 (attributing the disappearance of PMFs to pressures from the norm against mercenarism). 
69 SINGER, supra note 36, at 95–97 (explaining that employees of consulting firms may not engage in combat, but their 
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motivated by the same cause as the forces they support.70 PSCs guarding a military base or diplomatic 
convoy do present some control concerns as they are armed and operate with a degree of tactical 
independence.71  As this independence increases, however, PSCs tend to become more objectionable. For 
example, when Blackwater contractors engaged in the Najaf firefight, it did so, arguably, under greater 
control of the Coalition and for the purpose of defending the Coalition headquarters as they fought alongside 
Coalition soldiers.72 However, when Blackwater engaged in the Nisour Square incident, killing Iraqi citizens 
without cause, it did so apart from Coalition forces and undermined the cause of the Coalition to defend 
Iraqi citizens and strengthen the Iraqi government.73 While Blackwater’s security role in Iraq did not change 
significantly, the lack of control and attachment to an appropriate cause did shift. Thus, when the tip of the 
spear typology is applied to Percy’s norm-based spectrum, the elements of legitimate control and degree of 
attachment to a cause seem to bend the spear. 
While no bright line standard is provided using Percy’s spectrum, the legal obligation imposed by 
the norm on the use of modern private forces is more predictable. The spectrum illustrates the range of 
behavior by modern private forces prohibited by the norm against mercenarism and demonstrates the 
difficulty in precisely defining what behavior is prohibited by the norm. Incorporating the legal 
obligation underlying this norm into positive law poses a significant challenge and explains the 
ineffectiveness of recent attempts to prohibit or regulate mercenarism in IHL. 
III. PRIVATE FORCE UNDER IHL 
Although early IHL provisions such as The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
contained no express mention of mercenaries or private forces, they can be interpreted as applying to private 
force.74 Later IHL provisions like Additional Protocol I purport to directly regulate private force, however, these 
provisions are controversial and difficult to apply primarily due to their definitions of “mercenary.”75 One expert 
is quoted as stating that "any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition [under Article 47, 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 1977 defining mercenaries] . . . deserves to be shot – and his 
lawyer with him!”76 Treaties and conventions that attempt to regulate mercenaries “operate on a flawed 
definition of the concept[,]” failing to consider developments over time and address the fundamental problems of 
mercenaries.77 The norm against mercenary use along with its historical context enables one to analyze these 
provisions and determine their potential impact, if any, on the use of private force in the twenty-first century. 
A. HAGUE CONVENTIONS 
The first attempt to incorporate private force into IHL is found in Article 4 of the Hague Conventions, 
stating: “Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral 
                                                 
70 PERCY, supra note 16, at 61. 
71 See id. (explaining that while PCS’s are under state control, they are not under popular control and are often criticized for 
being “poorly monitored and under regulated”). 
72 See generally Scahill, supra note 54 (describing the Najaf battle, the lack of military command, and Blackwater’s defense of 
the Coalition headquarters). 
73 See Risen & Williams, supra note 57 (describing the Nisour Square incident as “one of the bloodiest” involving Blackwater 
and explaining that it “stoked anger and resentment among Iraqis”). 
74 Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2310, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf [hereinafter Hague Conventions]; see Kevin Govern & Eric Bales, 
Taking Shots at Private Military Firms: International Law Misses its Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 55, 68 (2008) 
(describing this convention as the “first attempt to codify customary international law on the use of mercenaries”). 
75 See Geoffrey Best, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 328, 
374 75 n.83 (1980) (explaining that the definition of mercenary is constructed narrowly and therefore it applies to “hardly 
anyone”). 
76 Id. 
77 Ryan M. Scoville, Toward an Accountability-Based Definition of “Mercenary,” 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 541 (2006). 
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Power to assist the belligerents.”78 Read in conjunction with Article 6,79 a state also has no affirmative 
obligation to prevent individuals from leaving or passing through its territory to join the conflict as a private 
fighter.80 Thus, the Hague Conventions provide no direct restriction on the use of private force by parties to 
a conflict or the participation by individual private fighters, only providing an obligation for neutral states 
regarding recruitment and organization. Whether this is an affirmative obligation to prevent recruitment or 
organization within the neutral state or merely to refrain from these activities is debatable. Some scholars 
reject any obligation by neutral states other than refraining from “the establishment of a wholly-owned PMF 
corporation by a nation’s government,”81 while others interpret this as an obligation to prevent the 
“organization or staging activities” of private forces within its borders.82 Although these provisions have 
largely been overshadowed by the subsequent Geneva Conventions, it is significant to note that the Hague 
Conventions impose virtually no limitation on individual or state combatants.83 
B. GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 
None of the four Geneva Conventions directly address private force.84 Some scholars argue that this 
silence, particularly with respect to Geneva III, should be interpreted as refusing to recognize private fighters 
as lawful combatants thereby denying them prisoner of war status.85 However, “[m]ost agree that the 
Conventions’ drafters intended to treat [private fighters] no differently than other combatants.”86 Geneva III 
clearly does not criminalize “mercenary activity” or private force, but would still seem to require states to 
hold members of a private force accountable for breaches of IHL.87 
Several provisions may even establish grounds for providing prisoner of war status to members of private 
forces. Article 4(A)(1) provides prisoner of war status to members of armed forces of a party to the conflict, so if 
private forces are incorporated into these armed forces, which is unlikely, they are covered by this provision.88 
Article 4(A)(2) also provides prisoner of war status for members of militias or volunteer corps that are 
“commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates . . . [that have] a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance . . . [that carry] arms openly . . . [and that conduct] their operation in accordance with the law and 
customs of war.”89 A fifth requirement includes a de facto link “with the state for which the group is fighting.”90 
Those meeting these qualifications are considered “legal combatants,” entitled to receive the protections of 
prisoner of war status if captured.91 Some argue application of this provision to modern private forces is contrary 
to Geneva III’s “historical purpose” to support “partisan fighting by ‘remnants of a defeated force or groups to 
                                                 
78 Hague Conventions, supra note 74, art. 4. 
79 Id. art. 6 (“The responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer 
their services to one of the belligerents.”). 
80 Major Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies, 
176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2003); see also PERCY, supra note 16, at 197 (discussing the rejection of a proposal to incorporate 
a ban of mercenary use reportedly failed due to concerns of violating individuals’ freedom of movement). 
81 Govern & Bales, supra note 74, at 69. 
82 Milliard, supra note 80, at 24. 
83 Id. (explaining that the Hague Conventions order a state to prevent domestic mercenary activity but does not require 
completely outlawing mercenarism). 
84 Geneva III, supra note 10, art. 4. 
85 Milliard, supra note 80, at 25. 
86 Id. 
87 Frye, supra note 6, at 2625; see Milliard, supra note 80, at 25 (explaining that state parties were still required “to hold 
mercenaries accountable for combatant actions amounting to grave breaches of the Conventions' provisions”). 
88 Louise Doswald-Beck, PMCs Under International Humanitarian Law, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND 
REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 118 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007). 
89 Geneva III, supra note 10, art. 4(A)(2). 
90 Doswald-Beck, supra note 88, at 118–19. 
91 Ridlon, supra note 7, at 219. 
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liberate an occupied territory.’”92 This argument is supported by the commentary accompanying Geneva III that 
specifically excluded from the definition of “partisan,” groups like the “Great Companies” that “devastated 
France in the fourteenth century, during the peaceful periods of the Hundred Years War.”93 Despite concerns that 
private firms operating in Iraq may not be able to claim status as “lawful combatants,” some scholars advocate 
extending protections to them under IHL as a matter of public policy to avoid creating a “disincentive” for those 
firms to observe IHL provisions in return.94 
Following a very thorough analysis of Article 4(A)(2), one JAG officer concluded that most private firms 
operating in Iraq would likely not meet the definition of militias or volunteer corps.95 Although some private 
security forces “carry arms openly,” their status is “questionable” due to their command structure and failure to 
wear distinctive symbols or emblems that would help “differentiate” them from the civilian population.96 While 
failing to wear a distinctive symbol is easily corrected, scholars are divided regarding whether the corporate 
structure of modern private forces is sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 4(A)(2).97 Thus, Article 
4(A)(2) does not appear to provide prisoner of war status for most modern private forces. 
Article 4(A)(4) provides civilians accompanying armed forces with prisoner of war status to the 
extent that they fill traditional civilian roles such as war correspondents or supply contractors, operate 
under the authorization of the armed forces, and are issued an identification card.98 Although civilians in 
this category are not legal combatants, they may still receive prisoner of war status but they are not 
entitled to receive combatant privilege.99 Combatant privilege generally relieves combatants from 
criminal responsibility for lawful acts of war such as killing enemy soldiers in battle. Without this 
privilege, private forces may be held criminally liable for directly participating in hostilities.100 Private 
contractors that merely provide a service to the military and are “not expected to fight” will typically 
qualify under this provision, but those that are expected to fight would likely not benefit from its 
protection.101 This provision would seem to include firms at the “base of the spear” like KBR that 
provide logistical support while disqualifying PSCs like Blackwater and other firms nearer the “tip of 
the spear” as it is anticipated that they will engage in combat. Another limitation on private firms in Iraq 
is that only a limited number of contractors accompany the armed forces while the vast majority 
accompanies other government agencies or even other contractors.102 
An obvious explanation for the omission of private forces from the 1949 Geneva Conventions is that 
they were largely absent from international conflict at the time of drafting. Members of the private forces in 
                                                 
92 Govern & Bales, supra note 74, at 71 (quoting Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies and Their Status Under 
International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 573, 586 (2006), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_863_cameron.pdf). 
93 Govern & Bales, supra note 74, at 71 (quoting Int’l Comm. Of the Red Cross, Commentary on Geneva Convention III 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 63 (1960), available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/WebList? 
ReadForm&id=375&t=com). 
94 Govern & Bales, supra note 74, at 71 (quoting Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies and Their Status Under 
International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 573, 586 (2006), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_863_cameron.pdf). 
95 Ridlon, supra note 7, at 228. 
96 Id. 
97 See id. at 225–26 (explaining that meeting the requirements of wearing distinctive symbols can be difficult because military 
personnel wear many different types of clothing and in order to satisfy article 4, the uniforms would have to be “sufficiently 
standardized”). 
98 Geneva III, supra note 10, art. 4(A)(4) (“Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one 
of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy . . . Persons who accompany the armed forces 
without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply 
contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have 
received authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany . . . .”). 
99 Ridlon, supra note 7, at 228, 243. 
100 Id. 
101 Doswald-Beck, supra note 88, at 124. 
102 Ridlon, supra note 7, at 228–29. 
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existence at the time were typically incorporated into state armed forces, satisfying both the legitimate 
control and cause elements of the norm against mercenary use.103 The use of private force would soon make 
an explosive reemergence in decolonized Africa, threatening other values such as national liberation and 
self-determination by supporting both legitimate governments and factions during coups.104 The result was a 
reaction to defend these values by creating a legal prohibition against mercenary use. The belief emerged 
that mercenary use “correlate[s] with human rights abuses, threatens state sovereignty, and contributes to 
various forms of international criminal activity.”105 This view failed to recognize that these negative 
externalities are “only secondary manifestations of the fundamental problem . . . [that] they are not state-
accountable actors.”106 Additional Protocol I exemplifies this negative reaction to the reemergence of private 
forces by depriving those defined as “mercenary” of the protections provided by combatant and prisoner of 
war status. However, Additional Protocol I fails to effectively address the underlying concerns regarding 
lack of legitimate control and improper cause. 
C. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF 1977 
Additional Protocol I, drafted after the reemergence of private force, complements the Geneva 
Conventions that were drafted at a time when private forces were largely not present on the world stage. 
Nevertheless, the two must be analyzed together.107 It is important to note that Protocol I has not been 
ratified by India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United States, although Afghanistan 
recently acceded to Protocol I in 2009 and Iraq in 2010.108 While provisions of Protocol I may be construed 
to apply to private forces, Article 47 in particular bans the use of mercenaries altogether.109 Thus, despite its 
potentially significant implications for private forces, Protocol I has not yet been ratified by several states 
that either export or employ private force. 
Provisions in Protocol I that define armed forces and provide them with prisoner of war status may be 
construed to include some private forces. Protocol I Article 43 defines “armed forces” and removes the 
distinction in Geneva III Article 4 between regular armed forces and other armed groups such as volunteer 
corps or militias while Article 44 provides prisoner of war status to these forces.110 Some scholars argue that 
for private forces to receive prisoner of war status under Protocol I Article 44, the party to the conflict must 
exercise some form of responsibility over the private forces, such as criminal jurisdiction, or even formally 
incorporate the private forces into the party’s armed forces’ chain of command.111 While many private 
forces might not satisfy such a narrow interpretation, contractors for the U.S. Defense Department in Iraq are 
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice as well as federal court jurisdiction and would still seem to 
qualify for the protections of Article 44.112 A broader interpretation views Article 43 as a fusion of Geneva 
III Article 4(A)(1) and (2), merely requiring a “factual link” to the party of the conflict to receive combatant 
                                                 
103 See Govern & Bales, supra note 74, at 70 (discussing mercenaries incorporated into state armed forces at time of 1949 Geneva 
Convention). 
104 PERCY, supra note 16, at 183–85. 
105 Scoville, supra note 77, at 544–45. 
106 Id. 
107 Govern & Bales, supra note 74, at 70. 
108 Doswald-Beck, supra note 88, at 118 n.7; see also News Release, Afghanistan Accedes to Additional Protocols I and II in 
Historic Step to Limit Wartime Suffering, I.C.R.C. News Release 129/09 (Jun. 24, 2009) (discussing Afghanistan’s accession 
to Protocols I and II). 
109 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, art. 47, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
110 Doswald-Beck, supra note 88, at 120. 
111 Id. at 120–21. 
112 Scheimer, supra note 30, at 620; see also 10 U.S.C.S. § 802(a)(10) (2009) (“In time of declared war or a contingency 
operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.”); see generally Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3261–67 (2009) (describing military procedure in response to criminal action 
committed by people accompanying, or under the employment of, the Armed Forces outside the United States). 
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status.113 The requirement in Article 43 that armed forces be “responsible” to the party to the conflict could 
present problems for such an interpretation, particularly for private forces that are from a different state and 
likely outside civil and criminal jurisdiction.114 Although some private forces might qualify for prisoner of 
war status under Articles 43 and 44, it is Article 47 that most directly addresses private forces and 
mercenarism. 
Article 47 provides significant consequences for those defined as “mercenaries” and may even have 
attained status as customary international law, reaching those conflicts between states that are not parties to 
Protocol I.115 Under Article 47, those defined as mercenaries lose their combatant status as well as the right 
to treatment as prisoners of war and can potentially face criminal sanctions for their conduct.116 Article 47 is 
titled “Mercenaries” and states: 
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war. 
2. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in 
fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions 
in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party 
to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member 
of its armed forces.117 
This definition of “mercenary,” however, is very difficult to apply as each element must be met, 
including the particularly subjective element of motivation.118 The motivation element is considered 
“practically unworkable” and “reflects a profound belief that it is wrong to be motivated by money rather 
than an appropriate cause, and that an inappropriate motivation is what makes a mercenary.”119 Scholars 
have discovered numerous alleged weaknesses in the Article 47 definition of “mercenary.” For example, 
Article 47(2)(a) would not seem to apply to the firms operating in Iraq that are recruited not to fight but 
rather to provide security.120 Others argue that this provision is designed to exempt permanently 
incorporated foreign services like the French Foreign Legion or Nepalese Ghurkhas and not private firms 
that only enter into contracts for a term of several years.121 One scholar explains that these apparent 
loopholes and weaknesses of Article 47 are merely evidence of the “strongly influential” but difficult to 
translate norm against mercenarism.122 Although the motivation element in Article 47(2)(c) was very likely 
                                                 
113 Doswald-Beck, supra note 88, at 121. 
114 Id. at 120–21 (stating that most private forces would be liable for breach of contact to the contracting state, establishing at least 
some responsibility). 
115 See Protocol I, supra note 109, art. 47. 
116 See Id. (establishing rights and criminal sanctions for mercenaries). 
117 Id. 
118 Govern & Bales, supra note 74, at 83. 
119 PERCY, supra note 16, at 179. 
120 Govern & Bales, supra note 74, at 84. 
121 Salzman, supra note 19, at 880–81. 
122 PERCY, supra note 16, at 170. 
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to be problematic, it was included because the drafters believed it “was the defining characteristic of a 
mercenary.”123 Rather than merely regulating mercenary conduct under IHL, the drafters undertook the 
much more difficult task of regulating mercenaries based on their status and motivation.124 
In fact, Article 47 seems out of place in Protocol I, “which is predicated on the idea that fighters should 
not be discriminated against on the basis of their motivation [and that IHL] ought to be universal and apply 
to all those in a theatre of war.”125 This discrimination based on status is even clearer considering the 
potential disparate treatment of mercenaries compared to that of other non-state fighters like terrorists. 
Article 45 provides the presumption that those taking part in hostilities are prisoners of war until their status 
is determined otherwise by a tribunal.126 Arguably, members of al Qaeda qualify for prisoner of war status 
upon capture and until tried while private forces like Blackwater risk immediate and arbitrary classification 
as mercenaries. Although mercenaries are still entitled to a fair trial prior to any punishment along with the 
fundamental guarantees provided in Article 75, this potential difference in treatment between terrorists and 
private contractors is indicative of the relative severity of Article 47.127 Thus, despite Article 47’s possible 
status as customary international law, its vagueness and the subjectivity inherent in the determination of 
proper motivation means that it fails to establish a well-defined and effective principle of IHL that is 
sufficient for regulating the use of modern private forces. 
Although Protocol I has not been ratified by some states that export or employ private force like 
the United States, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has determined that Article 47 
has reached status as customary international law. The ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, “intended to articulate and justify the rules of customary [IHL]”128 has determined that: 
“Mercenaries, as defined in Additional Protocol I, do not have the right to combatant or prisoner-of-war 
status.”129 Although the ICRC Report is not dispositive of customary international law, the authors 
identify numerous military manuals, including that of Israel, which is not a party to Protocol I, 
supporting the deprivation of prisoner of war status for mercenaries while noting protests from the 
United States.130 But the authors carefully narrow this deprivation of status under customary 
international law to only those individuals who meet the definition of “mercenary” in Protocol I.131 
Some scholars question this deprivation of status as a “significant departure from customary 
international law, which traditionally gave ‘mercenaries the same status as the members of the 
belligerent force for which they were fighting.’”132 They argue that “Protocol I singled out mercenaries 
based on a seemingly visceral reaction against their use during two decades in post-colonial Africa” 
rather than a codification of customary international law.133 The ICRC Report recognizes that Article 47 
                                                 
123 Id. at 178. 
124 Id. at 178–79. 
125 Id. at 178. 
126 Protocol I, supra note 109, art. 45; see also id. art. 46 (providing that spies are also not provided with prisoner of war status). 
127 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 393–94 (2005) 
[hereinafter ICRC Report] (providing that states may also choose to provide mercenaries with prisoner of war status). 
128 Leah Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 223–25 (2006) (“Customary law is an 
‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,’ resulting from ‘a general and consistent practice of 
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.’ Thus, a principle is considered customary law if many states across 
the world feel legally obliged to follow that principle. This sense of legal obligation is commonly referred to as opinio juris.” 
(quoting Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993) and (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987)). 
129 ICRC Report, supra note 127, at 393–94. 
130 Id. at 391–92. 
131 Id. at 393. 
132 Milliard, supra note 80, at 35–36 (quoting H.C. Burmester, The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflict, 72 
AM. J. INT’L L. 37, 55 (1978)). 
133 Id. at 38 (“Regarding moral legitimacy and foreign intervention, however, it may be unfair to characterize mercenaries as 
fighting with unclean hands vis-a-vis local guerillas and national armies.”). 
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was a response to mercenary involvement in Africa and that it since has “lost much of its meaning 
because the [Protocol I] definition . . . is very restrictive” and that recently “mercenaries have been less 
stigmatized.”134 Still, even if Article 47 has reached customary law status, its narrow definition is very 
difficult to apply to modern private forces. 
D. THE CRIME OF MERCENARISM: ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND UNITED NATIONS 
Similar to Protocol I, the Convention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa135 and the UN International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries136 sought to regulate the status of mercenaries rather than address the underlying 
normative concerns. These provisions were also responses to the controversial reemergence of private force in 
post-colonial Africa.137 Although the implications of these provisions are limited due to their regional nature or 
limited ratification, they are significant as they establish the crime of mercenarism and could have significant 
consequences for an individual captured within the nations and regions in which the provisions are effective.138 
Although the OAU Convention is one of the strongest conventions regarding private force, it has been 
largely disregarded as a “Cold War relic,” particularly for the lack of enforcement mechanisms and its 
failure to anticipate or restrict the hiring of private forces by African state governments seeking to maintain 
sovereignty.139 The OAU Convention criminalizes being a mercenary and denies mercenaries the status as 
lawful combatants or prisoners of war.140 In addition, it suffers from a weak legal framework due to an 
inadequate definition and loopholes for mercenaries that operate on the behalf of African governments.141 
Thus, it would have even been difficult to enforce against the private firm Executive Outcomes that operated 
under contract for the government of Sierra Leone in 1995. 
The UN Convention is significant because it also criminalizes the act of being a mercenary and 
establishes that mercenaries are not entitled to prisoner of war status.142 This convention represents an 
“elaborate hybrid of a mercenary definition . . . from predecessors of questionable legal lineage” including 
Article 47 of Additional Protocol I and the OAU Convention.143 Growing out of these provisions and UN 
Resolutions seeking to defend the norms of national liberation and self-determination,144 the UN Convention 
was drafted in 1989 but did not receive the required twenty-two state ratification until 2001 and still lacks 
support from most western states.145 It is criticized as offering merely “an amalgamation of legal concepts 
                                                 
134 ICRC Report, supra note 127, at 393–94. 
135 Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Jul. 3, 1977, O.A.U. Doc. CM/433/Rev. L. Annex 1 
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144 See Frye, supra note 6, at 2626 (discussing five resolutions on sovereignty and the use of mercenaries adopted by the U.N. 
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145 Id. at 2631; see PERCY, supra note 16 at 194–202 (describing the fear among Western states that: 1) the U.N. Convention 
would require states to arbitrarily restrict movement of their citizens, possibly in violation of human rights; and 2) they would 
be held responsible for their citizens’ actions abroad absolutely, despite practical concerns and customary law that private 
individuals, not states, are typically responsible for their actions abroad). 
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found in the OAU Mercenary Convention and Article 47.”146 The UN Convention uses a similar definition of 
mercenary as that found in Protocol I, but it also adds a second more expansive definition that sanctions a 
person for participating in an “act of violence” rather than participating in an armed conflict.147 This is 
significant as many private firms operate in states with no international armed conflict.148 This requirement is 
qualified however, by the act of violence being aimed at “[o]verthrowing a government” or “[u]ndermining the 
territorial integrity of a State,” which would likely eliminate many private firms operating in Iraq or 
Afghanistan seeking to protect the government and territorial integrity of the state in which they operate.149 
The second definition also requires that the person be motivated by “private gain” and “prompted by the 
promise or payment of material compensation.”150 While this requirement is easier to satisfy than proving 
“excess” compensation relative to armed forces as required in Article 47, the second definition also exempts 
those sent on official duty by a state, allowing for those contracted by a state agency to escape the definition.151 
Thus, attempts by both the UN and OAU to criminalize mercenarism fail to include the operations of modern 
private forces in the states that are parties to these conventions. Despite the failure of the UN and OAU 
provisions to effectively criminalize the operations of private forces, it is important to consider the implications 
for members of private forces that might fail to qualify for prisoner of war status under IHL. 
E. CAPTURED PRIVATE FORCES NOT QUALIFYING FOR POW STATUS 
If a member of a private force is captured and determined to not qualify for prisoner of war status, they 
qualify for protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (Geneva IV) as civilians.152 Geneva IV 
provides “protected persons” status to those who do not qualify for prisoner of war status and are from 
neutral or co-belligerent states with normal diplomatic representation.153 Those who fall outside Geneva IV 
and without prisoner of war status would “still have the benefit of fundamental customary rules relating to 
the prohibition of torture, inhumane treatment, and hostage-taking, as well as the right to a fair trial.”154 
Although those who qualify under Geneva IV as “protected persons” qualify for registration and visitation 
with the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as correspondence with family, they are not 
combatants and may be tried for violations of domestic law, such as murder, committed during the 
conflict.155 They may also be interned without trial “if the security of the Detaining Power makes it 
absolutely necessary” while remaining subject to human rights law, but they must to be released “as soon as 
the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist.”156 Thus, if members of private forces do not 
qualify for prisoner of war status, Geneva IV does provide some protection while in captivity despite 
potentially facing trial and punishment for their conduct in the conflict. 
                                                 
146 Milliard, supra note 80, at 56–57. 
147 Scheimer, supra note 30, at 629–30. 
148 Id. at 630 (“The U.N. convention’s broader coverage of acts of violence, instead of just armed conflicts, would cover PMC’s 
because PMCs often provide security and support in countries not currently engaged in international armed conflict.”). 
149 UN Convention Against Recruitment, supra note 136, art. 1(2)(a)(i)-(ii); see id. at 630 (“Overall, the second definition in the 
U.N. Convention has broader language that could apply to PMCs where Article 47 does not, but in the end, the requirement 
that mercenary actions must involve undermining a government limits the entire definition.”). 
150 UN Convention Against Recruitment, supra note 136, art. 1(2)(b). 
151 See Scheimer, supra note 30, at 630–31 (comparing the U.N. Convention to Article 47). 
152 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter Geneva IV], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36d2.html; See Doswald-Beck, supra note 
88, at 125 (“Those that do not benefit from POW status under the Third Geneva Convention are protected by the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 unless they are nationals of a neutral state or a co-belligerent state that has normal diplomatic 
representation in the state in whose hands they are.”). 
153 Doswald-Beck, supra note 88, at 125 n. 37 (discussing that those captured citizens from states with diplomatic representation 
would be protected by their home state). 
154 Id. at 125 n. 38 (discussing that these rights are codified in Article 75 of Protocol I). 
155 Id. at 125–26. 
156 Id. at 126 (quoting Geneva IV arts. 42 and 132–33). 
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F. ATTACKING PRIVATE FORCES 
Although private forces that qualify as combatants may clearly be attacked, the legality of attacking private 
forces that qualify as civilians is debatable.157 According to Protocol I Article 51 (3), “[c]ivilians shall enjoy 
protection [from attack] unless and for such time as they take part in hostilities.”158 A civilian’s “mere 
participation in the war effort is not meant to be included” in the taking part in hostilities.159 While interpretations 
may vary regarding what constitutes taking part in the hostilities, one scholar would prefer to narrow the 
definition to only direct acts of violence against civilians as the purpose is to “avoid deliberate attacks on 
civilians.”160 One scenario that might satisfy this narrow definition would seem to include collateral damage to a 
civilian private contractor resulting from an attack on military equipment on which the contractor is working. 
Since the emergence of private forces in recent conflicts, two documents – the ICRC’s Interpretative 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities and the Montreux Document – have 
specifically considered the legality of attacking private force. The ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance 
recommends that: 
Private contractors and employees of a party to an armed conflict who are civilians are entitled to 
protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
Their activities or location may, however, expose them to an increased risk of incidental death or 
injury even if they do not take a direct part in hostilities.161 
The ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance had initially focused on private forces, seeking “to define the legal 
status of contractors and to create systems whereby they can be held accountable for abuses they commit.”162 
However, the development of status of force agreements (like the one entered into between the United States 
and Iraq in 2008) and “best practices” for private force use suggested by the ICRC- and Swiss-sponsored 
Montreux Document led to a focus on “irregular” forces like Hamas and Hezbollah which had become a 
greater concern.163 Under the Montreux Document – entered into by seventeen states in 2008 including the 
United States, United Kingdom, China, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and South Africa – the status of 
private forces “is to be determined by International Humanitarian Law on a case-by-case basis, with 
particular regard to the nature and circumstances of the functions in which they are involved.”164 Private 
forces, however, are presumed to be protected “as civilians under IHL unless they are incorporated into the 
regular armed forces of a state or are members of organized armed forces” and, “[a]s with other civilians 
under IHL . . . [private forces] may not be the object of attack, unless and for such time as they directly 
participate in hostilities.”165 Thus, under both documents, private forces may only be targeted to the extent 
that they are directly participating in hostilities. A case-by-case analysis, however, would likely be required 
to determine whether attacks on private forces that qualify as civilians were appropriate under IHL. 
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Just as the emergence of private forces in Africa in the 1960s resulted in numerous proposals and provisions 
attempting to utilize IHL to proscribe mercenarism, the prevalence of private forces in Africa in the 1990s and 
recently in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in a variety of proposals from scholars to regulate or even ban 
private force. All of these proposals reflect the influence of the norm against mercenarism and the desire to exert 
legitimate control over private forces and restrict their use to an appropriate cause.166 Due to the transnational and 
mobile nature of private forces, purely domestic regulations tend to run into enforcement or jurisdictional issues 
and may result in a “race to the bottom” when domestic regulations of one state exceed those offered by another, 
causing a firm to relocate.167 Just as many American corporations seek incorporation in Delaware, private forces 
would seek the most advantageous and least regulated jurisdiction. For this reason, a coordinated international 
response to regulate private force is required. If and when any attempt to regulate private force is undertaken, 
support from the United States – not only as a superpower but also as major a client and employer of private 
force – is critical to avoid undermining the scheme in a similar fashion to those included in Protocol I and the UN 
Convention.168 Thus, while proposals to extend International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction or to create a 
licensing scheme to regulate private force are reasonable, an IHL provision that seeks to regulate private force in 
accordance with the norm against mercenarism is the only proposal that is likely to ultimately succeed. 
A. ICC JURISDICTION 
One proposal is to provide the ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of mercenarism, specifically under 
Article 5(d) of the Rome Statute as a “crime of aggression.”169 The jurisdiction of the ICC is derived from 
the consent of its treaty members, a list that does not include the United States.170 Until recently, no “crime 
of aggression” was defined in the Rome Statute, which must first be amended for the crime to be included in 
the Court’s jurisdiction.171 In June 2010, delegates from state parties and non-state parties to the Rome 
Statute met in Kampala, Uganda for the Review Conference of the Rome Statute and approved an 
amendment defining the crime of aggression and its jurisdiction.172 It defined the crime of aggression as the 
“planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression . . . .”173 One such act is 
                                                 
166 PERCY, supra note 16, at 195 (explaining the rationale behind the U.N. Convention as an almost universal condemnation of 
mercenaries). 
167 Gaston, supra note 12, at 241; see also Milliard, supra note 80, at 84 (comparing firm movement to jurisdictions with less 
regulation to the gravitating of U.S. corporations to Delaware and shipping firms to Panama). 
168 See Scheimer, supra note 30, at 643–44 (describing the weakened impact of international conventions due to an absence of 
U.S. support for regulating private force); see also Press Release, Security Council, U.N. Experts Visit the U.S. to Discuss Use 
of Private Military and Security Contractors, U.N Press Release (July 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/68E03AFA0761EEB2C12575F6002DEC30 ("It is crucial that the U.S. 
Government, as a major client of these companies, demonstrates its commitment to ensure full accountability of private 
military and security contractors for any possible violations of international human rights and humanitarian law."). 
169 Milliard, supra note 80, at 66–67; see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1)(d), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute] art. 5(1)(d) (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to 
the following crimes . . . The crime of aggression.”) available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/585. 
170 Craig S. Jordan, Who Will Guard the Guards? The Accountability of Private Military Contractors in Areas of Armed Conflict, 
35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 309, 331 (2009). 
171 Milliard, supra note 80, at 67; see Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 5(2) (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression once a provision is adopted . . . defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”). 
172 David Scheffer, State Parties Approve New Crimes for International Criminal Court, ASIL INSIGHT, June 22, 2010, available 
at http://www.asil.org/files/insight100622pdf.pdf. 
173 Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Kampala, Uganda, May 31 – June 11, 2010, The Crime of Aggression, ¶ 2, art. 
8bis(1) RC/11, Annex I (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Kampala Amendment]. 
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specifically identified as “[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the 
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”174 Although the ICC will not be able to exercise 
jurisdiction over this crime until at least the year 2017 or one year after ratification by thirty State parties, 
whichever is later, scholars have already noted the significant long-term impact of this provision.175 
The drafters of the Kampala Amendment looked to General Assembly Resolution 3314, which 
similarly defines aggression as “state – but not individual – participation in the use of force by 
militarily organized unofficial groups, such as mercenaries, ‘which carry out acts of armed force 
against another state.’”176 Notably, no definition of “mercenary” is provided, so the Court would likely 
consider the UN Mercenary Convention, “which delineates states' responsibilities and makes it a crime 
for any person to recruit, use, finance, or train ‘mercenaries, as defined’” therefore extending 
jurisdiction to state actors, including individuals acting in an official capacity.177 Although the UN 
Mercenary Convention would provide a readily available framework for the ICC, the lack of broad 
ratification and failure to adequately define “mercenary” in accordance with the norm against 
mercenary use seriously undermines its authority. The obvious problems remain of extending 
jurisdiction to citizens of states that are not parties to the Rome Statute such as the United States, 
Russia, China, India, and Indonesia. 
The Kampala Amendment does not provide the Court with jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression when committed by a national of a non-party State or on a non-party State’s territory.178 
Also, the Kampala Amendment allows a State party to choose not to accept the Court’s jurisdiction for 
this crime, excluding its nationals and territory from the Court’s jurisdiction for this crime.179 However, 
the United Nations Security Council may still refer any crime of aggression to the Court, thus bringing 
the crime within the Court’s jurisdiction.180 Because many states that export or employ private force 
are not parties to the Rome Statute or may choose to not accept the Court’s jurisdiction for the crime of 
aggression, some scholars have attempted to craft theories that would extend the Court’s jurisdiction 
for this crime.181 One theory of extending jurisdiction to non-party State nationals includes the concept 
that “all states may exercise criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes if the crime is considered 
‘prejudicial to the interest of the international community as a whole.’”182 Regardless of the validity of 
this theory based on “collective values” shared by the international community that results in 
“universal jurisdiction,” such a view has never been applied to private forces.183 For these reasons, any 
attempt to use the ICC to regulate private force will be undermined by jurisdictional issues and an 
inadequate criminal provision to apply to those who might come before the court. 
                                                 
174 Id. art. 8bis(2)(g). 
175 Id. art. 15bis(2)–(3); see Scheffer, supra note 172 (explaining that the new agreement’s ratification procedure may cause 
jurisdictional issues over crimes of aggression). 
176 Milliard, supra note 80, at 68; Kampala Amendment, supra note 152 art. 8bis(2) (“Any of the following acts, regardless of a 
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 
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179 Id. art. 15bis(4); see also Scheffer, supra note 172 (explaining that the Court does not have jurisdiction when a non-party State 
commits a crime of aggression). 
180 Scheffer, supra note 172. 
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B. LICENSING SCHEME 
Another approach toward regulation of private force is the establishment of an international licensing 
scheme that would license and then regulate private forces.184 Any such attempts, however, would likely be 
undermined by the lack of funding and consensus among states. This system would “distinguish legitimate 
[private forces] from the lone mercenary,” attaching a stigma to those firms that fail to become licensed as 
well as to those that hire unlicensed contractors.185 If enacted, such a scheme might have some influence on 
private forces with major states or large corporate clients seeking to avoid this stigma and lead the industry 
as a whole toward higher standards of conduct.186 While stigma may be an effective disincentive for those 
considering the prospect of bypassing regulation, the success of licensing schemes will ultimately depend 
upon oversight and enforcement mechanisms that require valuable resources to maintain.187 One scholar 
argues that it is “unrealistic” to even consider implementation of a “large and expensive” international 
regime similar to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).188 For this reason, inadequate 
funding will likely be a significant hurdle for any international licensing scheme to effectively regulate 
private force. 
Domestic politics would also present a major hurdle for a private force licensing proposal, resulting in 
a failure to reach a consensus among states. The difficulty of establishing a licensing or regulatory scheme 
involves reaching a consensus in light of the “highly divergent interests” among those advocating for a 
highly restrictive regime and the business interests of private forces in client or host states such as the United 
States or Great Britain.189 Client and host states of private force will likely not support a restrictive 
regulatory regime due to the strength and influence of politically powerful private force clients – both in 
corporations and government – as well as industry interest groups.190 Conversely, states that have ratified the 
UN Mercenary Convention or the OAU Convention where the norm against mercenarism is strongest, will 
likely seek to impose a very restrictive licensing or regulatory scheme, if they even approve of a plan that 
openly permits the use of private force at all.191 States influenced by these two divergent interests are 
unlikely to compromise to establish and implement a functional regulatory regime or even gather sufficient 
funding for such an expensive venture.192 As a result, a lack of funding and consensus among states would 
likely undermine any attempt to establish a licensing scheme for private force. 
C. IHL PROVISION 
An IHL provision that seeks to regulate private force and incorporate a definition based on the norm 
against mercenarism is the proposal most likely to regulate private force successfully. Some scholars have 
promoted an IHL provision “that openly recognizes the practice of outsourcing to [private forces] for what it 
                                                 
184 Scheimer, supra note 30, at 642–43. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. (explaining that under the licensing scheme countries could choose to hire illegal PMC’s but they would risk 
“becoming tainted” and “the stigma of being unaccredited would have an impact on their global business”). 
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REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 245, 245 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007). 
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189 Id. at 245; see also Gaston, surpa note 12, at 243 (discussing inconsistencies among states such as the United States and 
United Kingdom seeking to regulate private force while states like South Africa seek to ban them). 
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191 See PERCY, supra note 16, at 218, 220 (describing the norm against mercenary use as a “puritanical norm” or one that causes 
international actors to make “an unreflective condemnation without attention to the facts”). 
192 Bearpark & Schulz, supra note 187, at 245 (explaining that the licensing process would be extremely difficult due to diverse 
interests among “the stakeholders”). 
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is – a strategic tactic of warfare – and requires states to develop accountability and control mechanisms that 
can address some of the threats posed by modern [private forces].”193 Such an IHL provision would require 
“states that [use] nonstate actors as complements to military operations to establish oversight and control 
mechanisms that would ensure their compliance with international and domestic laws to the extent 
possible.”194 By addressing the underlying sense of legal obligation that states only utilize private force 
under legitimate control and when attached to an appropriate cause, this IHL provision would likely receive 
greater international support and ensure that the use of private force does not become objectionable.195 On 
the modified version of Percy’s norm-based spectrum of private force, this IHL provision would seem to 
permit uses of private force in the white area and ban those in the gray area as mercenarism.196 Although a 
visual depiction of the norm against mercenarism is not exact and is subject to regional variations in the 
strength of the norm, the flexible application of this IHL provision would fall roughly along these lines. 
States would have the flexibility to address greater concerns regarding private forces in their region and 
other states could regulate the use of private force while still complying with IHL.197 Because the permitted 
uses of private force in an IHL provision would be exercised under some form of legitimate control and with 
an elevated degree of attachment to an appropriate cause, they would be less objectionable and encourage 
greater compliance with IHL. 
Improving private force compliance with other IHL provisions by private forces would reduce the 
degree to which private force is objectionable. An IHL provision regulating private force would likely 
provide private forces with combatant status and the right to treatment as prisoners of war. Providing this 
status would incentivize private forces to comply with IHL as they would also benefit from its protections.198 
The additional degree of oversight by armed forces or a government agency would provide an enforcement 
mechanism to ensure IHL compliance by private forces. The effect of greater compliance with IHL would 
further improve the acceptance of private forces under greater control as a legitimate use of force. Despite 
the potential benefits of an IHL provision regulating private force, substantial obstacles still remain that 
might impede ratification and implementation. 
Although the same divergent interests that might impede the establishment of an international licensing 
scheme would also be present during the crafting of an IHL provision regulating private force, successful 
implementation is still possible. An IHL provision regulating private forces provides states with the 
“flexibility to oversee and regulate the unique contracting, outsourcing, and registration requirements of 
their own domestic laws.”199 While some states will still be able to place significant restrictions on private 
force under domestic law, major exporters of private force like the United States have already taken steps 
toward establishing regulation that asserts greater control over private forces.200 This demonstrates the 
potential for broad support of an IHL provision that addresses the divergent interests regarding the use of 
private force by allowing flexible state implementation. The ICRC-sponsored Montreux Document was 
joined in 2008 by seventeen states – including the United States, United Kingdom, Iraq, and Afghanistan – 
further indicating that a consensus exists to apply IHL to private forces as well as use IHL to control private 
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forces in accordance with the norm against mercenary use.201 Although some might argue that state 
implementation of IHL provisions involving controversial or politically sensitive issues is frequently weak, 
“an IHL provision [regulating private force] may still be useful in driving the issue, solidifying emerging 
norms, and coordinating state approaches.”202 At the very least, an IHL provision would establish that 
private force is permissible as long as it is utilized in accordance with the norm against mercenarism. Still, 
implementation might not be as weak as previous IHL provisions. A movement toward regulation – rather 
than an outright ban – in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates a willingness by states in which private forces 
operate to recognize the legitimate uses of private force and allow their continued operation with greater 
accountability.203 Thus, although ratification and implementation concerns still exist, an IHL provision that 
addresses the underlying concerns of the norm against mercenarism presents the proposal most likely to 
ensure successful regulation of private force. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because private forces are likely to maintain a critical role as “silent partners” to the parties in armed 
conflicts of the twenty-first century, an IHL provision is needed that defines “mercenary” in accordance with 
the norm against mercenarism and regulates the conduct of private forces in accordance with the norm. Of 
the existing IHL provisions and the many additional proposals offered by scholars that seek to regulate or 
ban mercenarism, few address the normative concerns underlying these provisions and proposals. The 
ineffective definitions of “mercenary” in Protocol I, the UN Convention, and the OAU Convention reflect 
misguided state attempts to ban the characteristics of private force perceived to be objectionable as 
mercenarism. The more effective answer lies in creating an IHL provision addressing this problem. 
For an IHL provision to effectively regulate the use of private force and ban mercenarism, it must 
ensure legitimate control is exerted over private force and that private force is only utilized when it is 
attached to some appropriate cause. This IHL provision would therefore permit the use of Blackwater forces 
in Najaf in 2004, but would find the conduct in Nisour Square in 2007 objectionable and require that the 
private fighters be held accountable by the United States. Thus, an IHL provision based on the norm against 
mercenarism, rather than a linear classification of private force or a narrow definition, is the most likely 
proposal to receive broad international support and to effectively regulate modern private force. 
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